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ECONOMISTS ON DEREGULATION OF THE
AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION: PRAISE AND
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The outstanding essays and articles in this symposium and our discussions at the conference itself raise a critical policy question: whether the
time has come to take deregulation of the American legal profession seriously. David Barnhizer argues that we should abandon our “Unethical System of Ethics.”2 Jack Guttenberg likewise asserts that the current system of
lawyer regulation is based upon outdated assumptions about the nature of
the profession and the practice.3 Renee Knake challenges the constitutionality of the ABA and state bar associations’ ban on corporate ownership of
1. Professor of Law, University of Tennessee College of Law. B.A. 1991, Haverford College; J.D. 1996, University of Michigan. The author gives special thanks to Brannon
Denning, Thomas Morgan, Daniel D. Barnhizer, David Barnhizer, Aviva Abramovsky, John
Flood, Jack A. Guttenberg, Peter T. Hoffman, Joan W. Howarth, Dan Katz, Renee Newman
Knake, Izabela Krasnicka, Blake Morant, Russell Pearce, Avrom Sherr, Steven R. Smith,
Laurel S. Terry, Gordon Turriff, Alan C. Weinstein, the Michigan State University College
of Law and the Michigan State University Law Review for organizing the Lawyers as Conservators Symposium, Indya Kincannon, Jeff Hirsch, Alex Long, Jennifer Hendricks, Glenn
Reynolds, Wendy Bach and the University of Tennessee College of Law for generous research support, and the Honorable Diana Gribbon Motz.
2. EDS: I’m assuming this is what the paper will say. PLEASE ADD CITE TO
THE PAPER.
3. EDS: I’m assuming this is what the paper will say. PLEASE ADD CITE TO
THE PAPER.
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law firms.4 Paul Paton describes some of the regulatory changes in the U.S.
and elsewhere and argues that regulatory change is inevitable.5 John Flood
and Avrom Sherr share the experience of the U.K.’s large-scale deregulatory experiment.6
Taken together, these papers suggest that the American legal profession is facing a period of extraordinary strain and change and that deregulation in part or in whole may finally be a realistic possibility. The U.K. perspective offers a vision of a different, and less regulated, market for American legal services. Flood and Sherr’s work make clear that substantial deregulation of the market for legal services is not incompatible with a highfunctioning and fair common-law justice system. To the contrary, the U.K.
experience suggests that some parts of the American system might be fairer
if deregulatory measures were considered.
This symposium’s papers are a critical part of a broader academic discussion of deregulating the American legal profession. For example, the
legal blog Truth on the Marketplace recently held an on line symposium
entitled “Unlocking the Law: Deregulating the Legal Profession.”7 I have
similarly argued in the past that the current regulation of American lawyers
is exactly backwards—entry regulations are indefensibly high (suggesting
that they are more useful to protecting existing lawyers than consumers) and
conduct regulations are grossly under-enforced (suggesting that protecting
existing lawyers is more important than protecting clients).8
There is a parallel discussion occurring on the same topic in a different
field of study: economists are building their own argument for deregulation
of the legal profession and presenting their own empirical studies. The most
notable example is a new book by three economists, Clifford Winston, Robert Crandall, and Vikram Maheshri, entitled First Thing We Do, Let’s De-

4. EDS: I’m assuming this is what the paper will say. PLEASE ADD CITE TO
THE PAPER.
5. EDS: I’m assuming this is what the paper will say. PLEASE ADD CITE TO
THE PAPER.
6. EDS: I’m assuming this is what the paper will say. PLEASE ADD CITE TO
THE PAPER(S).
7. Truth on the Marketplace, Unlocking the Law: Deregulating the Legal Profession, available at “http://truthonthemarket.com/unlocking-the-law-symposium/ (last visited
November 1, 2011).
8. See Benjamin H. Barton, Why Do We Regulate Lawyers?: An Economic Analysis of the Justifications for Entry and Conduct Regulation, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 429, 436-63
(2001) (hereinafter “Economic Analysis”); BENJAMIN H. BARTON, THE LAWYER-JUDGE BIAS
IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 140-59 (2011).
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regulate All the Lawyers (“Let’s Deregulate”).9 Their work follows in the
path of previous economic studies of the market for legal services.10
It is unfortunate that these two discussions have been happening simultaneously, but separately. This Article seeks to (very briefly and selectively) introduce the legal audience to the work of the economists, to discuss
what parts of the economist’s case for deregulation are most, and least, persuasive, and how these two discussions can be enriched by mutual recognition and interaction. Part I offers a very brief overview of the orthodox
economic take on occupational licensing and its application to American
lawyers. Part II uses Let’s Deregulate to elucidate the strengths and weaknesses of the economists’ take on lawyer deregulation. Part III continues
this discussion by noting the special advantages and disadvantages economists bring to this project as outsiders—they can easily identify and disregard our professional shibboleths, but they also miss some important nuances in the nature of the profession and our regulation. The Article concludes
by noting that more cross-pollination between economists and lawyers on
this topic could prove extraordinarily helpful.
I. ECONOMISTS ON THE REGULATION OF THE PROFESSIONS
As a general rule, economists have expressed a longstanding hostility
to occupational regulation. The two most famous (and persuasive) examples come from Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations and Milton Friedman’s
Capitalism and Freedom.
A. Wealth of Nations
The Wealth of Nations was first published in 1776 and is one of the
foundational works in classical economics, as well as one of the most powerful and lasting defenses of the superiority of free markets.11 One of
Smith’s main targets in The Wealth of Nations was the European policy
allocating an “exclusive privilege of an incorporated trade,” what we now
refer to as occupational regulation/licensing.12 In pre-industrial revolution
Europe this regulation was generally accomplished by professional guilds,
which limited admission to those who had served as apprentices. The guilds
also limited the total number of apprentices and the length of apprentice9. CLIFFORD WINSTON, ROBERT W. CRANDALL & VIKRAM MAHESHRI, FIRST THING
WE DO, LET’S DEREGULATE ALL THE LAWYERS (2011) (Hereinafter LET’S DEREGULATE).
10. See, e.g., Mario Pagliero, Licensing Exam Difficulty and Entry Salaries in the
U.S. Market for Lawyers, 48 BRITISH J. INDUS. REL. 726 (2010); Peter B. Pashigian, The
Market for Lawyers: The Determinants of the Demand for and Supply of Lawyers, 20 J. L. &
ECON. 53 (1977).
11. ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (Great Minds Series ed. 1991).
12. ID. at 126.
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ship, effectively restraining the number of entrants into any regulated profession.13
Smith lays out three ills associated with this occupational regulation:
First, by restraining the competition in some employments to a smaller number
than would otherwise be disposed to enter into them; secondly, by increasing it in
others beyond what it naturally would be; and, thirdly, by obstructing the free circulation of labour and stock, both from employment to employment and from place
to place.14

Smith’s argument includes both a moral/libertarian element and an
explicitly economic one. On a moral level, occupational regulation violates
the “property which every man has in his own labour;” this property “is the
original foundation of all other property, so it is the most sacred and inviolable.”15 On a purely economic level, these regulations reduce competition
and are meant to prevent a “reduction in price, and consequently of wages
and profit, by restraining . . . free competition.”16
Smith likewise denies the necessity for the regulation, arguing that the
“institution of long apprenticeships can give no security that insufficient
workmanship shall not frequently be exposed to public sale.”17 Lastly,
Smith states quite pithily how and why these regulations arise: “[p]eople of
the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but
the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices.”18
In short, roughly 235 years ago Adam Smith stated the basic critique
of occupational regulation with great prescience and clarity. The later economic critiques all bear the basic imprint of Smith’s work.
B. Capitalism and Freedom and the Current Critique
Chapter Nine of Milton Friedman’s Capitalism and Freedom is the
other foundational text19 for the economic critique of occupational licens-

13. ID. at 126-29.
14. ID. at 126.
15. ID. at 129.
16. ID. at 131.
17. ID. at 130.
18. ID.at 137.
19. Note that this is an extremely condensed recap. Other foundational texts include
George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3, 1317 (1971) (describing licensing and the collective political power of an occupation); Kenneth
J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 Am. Econ. Rev. 941,
966-67 (1963); Keith B. Leffler, Physician Licensure: Competition and Monopoly in American Medicine, 21 J.L. & Econ. 165, 185-86 (1978) (examining economic perspectives of
physician licensure). OCCUPATIONAL LICENSURE AND REGULATIONS (S. Rottenberg ed. 1980)
collects a number of other important economic works on licensure.
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ing.20 Like The Wealth of Nations, Capitalism and Freedom is a forceful
and readable defense of free markets and a powerful critique of government
regulation in general.
Like The Wealth of Nations, Friedman launches his critique with an
explicit libertarian appeal to freedom of labor and a rebuke of the medieval
guild system, arguing that the “overthrow of the medieval guild system was
an indispensible early step in the rise of freedom in the Western World” and
that the “retrogression” back to licensure in the twentieth century has been
enormously harmful.21
Before attacking the economic effects of licensure, Friedman notes a
disturbing “common feature” of licensure: “the legislation” establishing
licensure is generally “enacted on behalf of [the] producer group”22 and then
governed by the group itself.23 The regulation eventually ossifies into powerful barriers to entry and monopoly rents for the licensed profession, with
little or no accompanying benefit to the public.24 Friedman argues against
licensing physicians,25 with sideswipes at barbers26 and lawyers27 along the
way.
Economists have built upon these arguments to present a powerful
case against occupational licensing.28 The case begins with the logic of collective action: concentrated groups that have a large per capita stake in government regulation tend to do much better than diffuse groups with low per
capita costs, even if the second group is much larger than the first and even
if the aggregate cost to society is quite high.29 Thus, every industry or oc20. MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 137-60 (1982). Friedman actually wrote his dissertation on occupational licensing, so Chapter Nine of Capitalism and Freedom is a greatly condensed version of his thoughts on the topic. See MILTON FRIEDMAN &
SIMON KUZNETS, INCOME FROM INDEPENDENT PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE (1945) (Friedman’s
dissertation).
21. ID. at 137.
22. ID. at 139.
23. ID. at 140.
24. ID. at 140-60.
25. ID. at 149-60.
26. ID. at 142-43.
27. ID. at 153.
28. See generally Simon Rottenberg, Introduction, in OCCUPATIONAL LICENSURE
AND REGULATION 1, 3 (Simon Rottenberg ed. 1980); J. Howard Beales III, The Economics of
Regulating the Professions, in REGULATING THE PROFESSIONS, A PUBLIC POLICY SYMPOSIUM
125, 135 (Roger D. Blair & Stephen Rubin eds., 1980) For studies showing higher costs to
consumers from occupational licensing, see AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF RETIRED PERSONS,
CONSUMER AFFAIRS SECTION, UNREASONABLE REGULATION = UNREASONABLE PRICES (1986)
(considering optometry, dentistry, hearing aid sales, and funeral sales); Alex Maurizi, Occupational Licensing and the Public Interest, 82 J. POL. ECON. 399 (1974).
29. The classic statement of this effect is MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF
COLLECTIVE ACTION 22-52 (1965) (describing the dominance of small groups over large
groups in the political and regulatory process).
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cupation that has enough political power will seek to utilize the state’s power to assist its business, either through direct subsidies, price-fixing, barriers
to entry, or through suppression of competing industries.30
Professions are the quintessential concentrated interest group, so they
tend to triumph in both the political and regulatory processes. Barriers to
entry, which make it harder for new competitors to enter the market and
thus inflate the wages of current practitioners, are the prime example.31
C. Application of this Framework to Lawyers
The Smith/Friedman story about the nature of occupational licensure
has been applied to lawyers. Economists32 and law professors alike have
argued that the many barriers to entry to the legal profession—the requirement of undergraduate education, the law school requirement (and the various American Bar Association (ABA) sub-requirements involving law libraries, faculties, etc.), the character and fitness process and the bar exam
(and other MPRE type exams) —are unjustifiably high and harmful to the
public.33
The argument against lawyer regulation is both theoretical and a historical. As a historical matter, as of the middle of the nineteenth century,

30. For another seminal work in the area, see George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3, 5-6 (1971)(“Crudely put, the butter
producers wish to suppress margarine and encourage the production of bread.”).
31. See MANCUR OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS: ECONOMIC GROWTH,
STAGFLATION AND THE SOCIAL RIGIDITIES 226 (1982).
32. See B. Peter Pashigian, The Market for Lawyers: The Determinants of the Demand for and Supply of Lawyers, 20 J. L. & ECON. 53, 80-85 (1977) (hereinafter “Market for
Lawyers”) (concluding that law schools have undersupplied lawyers for market demand, and
that lawyer wages have been inflated as a result); B. Peter Pashigian, The Number and Earnings of Lawyers: Some Recent Findings, 1 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 51 (1978) (same) (hereinafter “Number and Earnings”); D.S. LEES, ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE PROFESSIONS 3544 (1966) (examining the British legal market). But see Malcolm Getz et al., Competition at
the Bar: The Correlation Between the Bar Examination Pass Rate and the Profitability of
Practice, 67 VA. L. REV. 863 (1981) (concluding that bar exam pass rates do not have an
effect on the salaries of lawyers).
33. For some of my work on the subject, see Barton, Economic Analysis, supra note
__, at 434-63; see also BARTON, supra note __, at 140-54. For seminal works by others, see,
e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1, 97-98 (1981) (arguing against the restrictions on the unauthorized practice of law); DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS
AND JUSTICE, AN ETHICAL STUDY 269 (1988) (proposing “to deregulate, wholly or partially,
the market for routine legal services -- wills, probate, real estate closings, uncontested divorces, and so forth -- by allowing non-lawyers and paralegals to perform them”); W. Clark
Durant, Maximizing Access to Justice: A Challenge to the Legal Profession, in DEBORAH L.
RHODE & DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS 832-40 (1992).
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deregulation of the legal profession was widespread,34 and bar associations
largely defunct.35 Beginning in the 1870s, lawyers began to form organized
bar associations,36 including the nascent ABA.37 From the outset, the new
bar associations had a regulatory mission, to punish the “activities of a notorious fringe of unlicensed practitioners”38 and require higher qualifications
for admission to practice.39
A brief review of the current barriers to entry establishes the success
of this project: new entrants must generally complete at least three years of
undergraduate education (and many states and law schools require a degree), must graduate from an ABA accredited law school, and must pass a
particular state’s bar examination and character and fitness examinations.40
These entry barriers are expensive monetarily and temporally and there is
ample evidence that the expense to the public is not worth the benefit. The
easiest way to demonstrate this point is consideration of the skills of the
newest members of the bar. Query what legal tasks, if any, we could guarantee that a lawyer could perform on the day she is sworn in.41
II. LET’S DEREGULATE ALL THE LAWYERS
Let’s Deregulate is the most recent application of the economic argument for occupational deregulation to the American legal profession.42 The
book argues that lawyers earn an inflated wage through two different types
of government regulations.
First, lawyers have pushed for high barriers to entry, thus restricting
the overall supply of lawyers and keeping many new competitors out of the
34. See ROSCOE POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES 227-28
(1953) (“In 1800 a definite period of preparation for admission to the bar was prescribed in
fourteen of the nineteen states or organized territories which then made up the Union. In
1840 it was required in but eleven out of thirty jurisdictions. In 1860 it had come to be required in only nine of the then thirty-nine jurisdictions.”).
35. Benjamin H. Barton, Do Judges Systematically Favor the Interests of the Legal
Profession?, 59 AL. L. REV. 453, 461 (2008).
36. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 648-52 (1985).
37. ALFRED ZANTZINGER REED, TRAINING FOR THE PUBLIC PROFESSION OF THE LAW
220 (1921) (ABA founded in 1878 in Saratoga, New York, by “seventy-five gentlemen from
twenty-one jurisdictions, out of approximately 60,000 lawyers then practicing in the United
States.”).
38. See FRIEDMAN, supra note __, at 649-50.
39. See W. Hamilton Bryson & E. Lee Shepard, The Virginia Bar, 1870-1900, in
THE NEW HIGH PRIESTS: LAWYERS IN POST-CIVIL WAR AMERICA, 171-72 (Gerald W. Gawalt,
ed. 1985).
40. BARTON, supra note __, at 121-22.
41. For a much fuller version of this argument, see Benjamin H. Barton, An Institutional Analysis of Lawyer Regulation: Who Should Control Lawyer Regulation – Courts,
Legislatures or the Market?, 37 GA. L. REV. 1167, 1190 & n. 80 (2003).
42. See LET’S DEREGULATE, supra note __.
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profession.43 This argument is familiar and dates back to at least Adam
Smith. Nevertheless, the book offers a powerful new addition to the argument; it offers the most thorough and rigorous empirical demonstration of a
measurable earnings premium for lawyers.44 These sections of Let’s Deregulate are discussed in Part II.A below.
Second, lawyers have pushed to affect the demand for legal services
by lobbying for complicated laws and regulations in “contentious policy
areas,” like “environmental standards governing pollution emissions and
discharges” or “the resolution of intellectual property disputes” or “classaction liability suits.”45 This portion of the analysis states a newer critique
of the legal profession; the bulk of the study of government regulation and
lawyer incomes has focused on barriers to entry. The relationship of lawyer
income to legal complexity is, in fact, a burgeoning and fascinating topic of
study.46 Nevertheless, this part of the analysis is weaker because the causal
link between the behavior of lawyers as an interest group and the allegedly
harmful government regulation is much weaker. These sections of Let’s
Deregulate are discussed in Part II.B.
The comparison of these two different grounds helps establish the special strengths and weaknesses that economists bring to the debate over the
regulation of lawyers. Let’s Deregulate offers a clear view of the valuable
contributions that economists can make to the discussion of deregulating the
legal profession. Most notably, economists are able to estimate the costs
and benefits of licensure. 47 This adds empirical meat to the bones of the
common sense argument against licensure made by Smith and Friedman.
Of course the devil is in the details and what exactly what one counts
as a cost and a benefit of lawyer licensure determines how the balance
comes out. As a result, it is particularly important that an argument for deregulation be conservative (small “c” conservative) and built on generally
agreed to principles.
Unfortunately, the second half of Let’s Deregulate’s argument suffers
from gross over-reach. It is one thing to extrapolate from demonstrably true
propositions, for example, the requirements for entering the legal profession
are very expensive48 or that more people would like to enter the legal profession than are allowed to (limiting the supply of legal services and in-

43. ID. at 9-14.
44. ID. at 24-56.
45. ID. at 14-15.
46. My thoughts on the nature of legal complexity and the roles that lawyers and
judges play in creating and maintaining that complexity can be found in LAWYER-JUDGE
B
47IAS, supra note __, at 259-83.
Let’s Deregulate, supra note __, at 73-81.

48.

LET’S DEREGULATE, supra note __, at 9-14.
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creasing the cost).49 It is a different matter to argue that lawyers have successfully lobbied for complex regulations in an effort to drive up their salaries.50 The causes, costs and benefits of environmental regulation are too
varied and complicated to boil down to just their effect on the legal profession. Moreover, the idea that lawyers are the prime movers behind these
regulations is, to put it kindly, a challenging empirical proposition.51
A. Strengths of the Economic Approach
The best part of Let’s Deregulate (and the economic approach in general) is also the most straightforward. The authors demonstrate that barriers
to entry result in fewer lawyers and that this reduced supply likely results in
higher salaries for lawyers. First, the authors succinctly describe how expensive it is to become a lawyer and how the barriers to entry constrain the
number of lawyers.52 The authors correctly identify law schools as the primary bottleneck:
Given that 95 percent of people who enroll in an ABA-accredited law school eventually pass a state bar examination, the primary factor that limits the supply of lawyers in the United States is clearly the number of available spaces in [law] schools.
Indeed, the number of applicants to U.S. law schools has risen more than 50 percent since 1976, while total enrollments have increased only 26 percent.53

Existing law schools have failed to expand to meet the demand out of
concern for the U.S. News and World Report rankings and a desire to maintain the highest quality student pool.54 The ABA has suppressed the creation new schools through the expensive and intensive accreditation process.55 As a result, approximately fifty percent of the potential entrants to
the market are deterred each year.56
Next, Let’s Deregulate demonstrates how reduced supply results in
higher wages. American lawyer salaries are compared to other licensed and
unlicensed jobs and lawyers are found to enjoy a significant salary premium
49. ID. at 11-12 (noting that from 1997-2004 approximately 50% of law school
applicants were not admitted to any law school).
50. ID. at 14-16.
51. See infra Section II.B
52. ID. at 9-14.
53. ID. AT 12.
54. ID. at 12-13. See also Pashigian, Market for Lawyers, supra note __, at 60-61
(noting that non-profit, high quality law schools have little incentive to expand to meet increased student and market demand); MICHAEL SAUDER AND WENDY ESPELAND, FEAR OF
FALLING: THE EFFECTS OF U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT RANKINGS ON U.S. LAW SCHOOLS 1114 (2007), available at http://www.lsac.org/lsacresources/Research/GR/GR-07-02.pdf (describing effects of the rankings on admissions criteria and decisions).
55. LET’S DEREGULATE, supra note __, at 12-14.
56. ID. at 11 (From 1997-2004 roughly half of the 800,000 applicants to American
law schools were not admitted to any law school).
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(second only to doctors).57 This premium increased between 1974 and
2004.58
An earlier study of lawyer salaries by Sherman Rosen posited that the
bulk of this premium was due to the skills and/or abilities of lawyers.59
Let’s Deregulate seeks to rebut this concept by noting that the average
LSAT and GPA of entering law students has not changed significantly over
the studied period (suggesting that lawyers themselves have remained intrinsically similar) and that the salary premium of lawyers has grown over
time, while other skill intensive professions like engineers or doctors have
experienced relatively stable premiums (suggesting that the increased lawyer premium is not the result of the acquisition of specialized skills).60
Let’s Deregulate concludes that “the United States is spending $170
billion a year on lawyers (in 2005 dollars) [and the] 2004 lawyers’ earning
premiums amounted to $64 billion – or an eye-popping $71,000 per practicing lawyer – and that those premiums were widely shared among the legal
profession.”61 The authors provide extensive data to support this conclusion. 62 Even if the absolute figure is rejected, the conclusion that barriers to
entry have raised lawyer salaries is patent and inescapable.
There are some points in the analysis that are worth quibbling with.
Notably, a great deal of the study covers the years 1974-2004,63 which is a
somewhat inopportune set of years, as the late 1970s and early 1980s were a
particularly challenging time for legal profession earnings in comparison to
the 1960s or the late-1980s.64 The current period (from 2005-2011) has
likewise been rougher than 1984-2004.65 The time period matters because
some of the argument is based on an increase in the salary premium over
time, so choosing a relative trough to start the analysis and a relative peak to
end it, makes the analysis weaker than if it had covered a longer and more
inclusive period of time.66
Nevertheless, the book is the most comprehensive and authoritative
empirical argument about the costs of entry regulation for lawyers to date.
57

62

ID. AT 37, 39.

58.
59.
60.
61.

ID. at 30-56.
Sherwin Rosen, The Market for Lawyers, 35 J. L. & ECON. 215, 216-18 (1992).
LET’S DEREGULATE, supra note __, at 47-55.
ID. at 55.

ID at 24-55.

63.
64.
65.

See ID. at 16-22.
Rosen, supra note __, at 234-38.
See, e.g., SALARY DISTRIBUTION CURVE FOR THE CLASS OF 2009 SHOWS
RELATIVELY FEW SALARIES WERE CLOSE TO THE MEAN, NAT’L ASS’N FOR LAW PLACEMENT
(July 2010), http:// www.nalp.org/startingsalarydistributionclassof2009; STARTING SALARY
DISTRIBUTION FOR CLASS OF 2008 MORE DRAMATIC THAN PREVIOUS YEARS, NAT’L ASS’N FOR
LAW PLACEMENT (June 2009), http://www.nalp.org/08saldistribution.
66. For example, Pashigian’s studies started in the 1920s and continued to the publication date. See Pashigian, Market for Lawyers, supra note __, at 63-67; Pashigian, Number
and Earnings, supra note __, at 67-77.
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It is thus of a piece with the best of the economic scholarship on this topic:
it uses the available data and statistical analysis to support an otherwise
common-sense hypothesis: restricting entry raises prices unjustifiably.
B. Weaknesses – Policy Arguments Disguised as Empirical Arguments
Two of the authors of Let’s Deregulate, Clifford Winston and Robert
Crandall have proven controversial figures in the past—famously arguing in
2003 “that the current empirical record of antitrust enforcement is weak”
and as a result, enforcement actions should be limited to “only the most
egregious anticompetitive violations.”67 Opposing scholars accused Winston and Crandall of overreach and harshly criticized the paper’s empirical
and policy bases.68
I am not in a position to dispute their conclusions about antitrust, but
can report that half of the argument in Let’s Deregulate is unsustainable as
an empirical matter. The authors’ argument on the supply side of the equation (there are fewer lawyers than there would be otherwise due to entry
barriers) is quite persuasive. The authors’ demand side argument that government regulation is a significant source of inflated lawyer salaries and that
lawyers as an interest group have successfully lobbied for increased regulation, is off the mark.
Let’s Deregulate argues that “the demand for lawyers in the public
and private sector has experienced continual growth, thanks in part to government policies that require private firms to retain legal counselor encourage them to engage in litigation.”69 The authors “focus on a subset of the
most important and contentious policy areas that help generate greater demand for attorneys and their services.”70 These include “environmental
standards governing pollution emissions,” “the resolution of intellectual
property disputes,” “class-actions suits,” and state “consumer protection
acts.”71
The authors’ frontal assault on much of the recent law and regulation
protecting consumers and the environment is obviously controversial, and
less empirically demonstrable. Nevertheless, in order to connect their poli-

67. Robert W. Crandall & Clifford Winston, Does Antitrust Policy Improve Consumer Welfare? Assessing the Evidence, 17 J. ECON. PERSPS. 3, 3-4 (2003).
68. See, e.g., Jonathan B. Baker, The Case for Antitrust Enforcement, 17 J. ECON.
PERSPS. 27 (Fall 2003); GREGORY J. WERDEN, THE EFFECT OF ANTITRUST POLICY ON
CONSUMER WELFARE: WHAT CRANDALL AND WINSTON OVERLOOK (AEI-Brookings Joint
Center
for
Regulatory
Studies
ed.,
Apr.
2004),
available
at
http://
aei.brookings.org/admin/authorpdfs/page.php?id=933.
69. LET’S DEREGULATE, supra note __, at 14.
70. ID.
71. ID. at 14-16.
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cy attack on this regulation to lawyers the authors are required to “double
down” on their shaky foundation with two further logical leaps.
First, they must argue that the costs associated with these policies
outweigh the benefits.72 This is enormously problematic, because any argument against government regulation or consumer protection lawsuits is a
complicated one that will not garner general agreement on either the costs
or benefits, let alone their effect on a totally separate area of the economy
(the demand for legal services). This is a topic that has been widely debated
among the public and economists,73 and is not suitable to a brief overview as
part of ninety-nine page book.74
Second, in order to connect these regulations in to the legal profession,
the authors attempt to prove that as an interest group the legal profession
has successfully lobbied hard for these regulations and others.75 Let’s Deregulate does admit that “[i]t is difficult to provide systematic quantitative
evidence of lawyers’ influence in generating or maintaining specific inefficient public policies that are solely or partly intended to benefit them,” but
then goes on to provide “circumstantial evidence,” in the form of a collection of anecdotes about lawyers lobbying legislatures.76
It is certainly true that the ABA and the various state bar associations
are powerful lobbying entities. It is likewise true that the ABA played a
large role in the legislative successes the authors describe, as well as many
others they overlook.77 It is a completely other matter to argue that policies
as diverse as environmental regulation or consumer protection are in any
way “caused” by lawyers. These sorts of policies are inevitably the result of
large and shifting political alliances, not any single group.
Further, previous economic scholarship and some of the authors’ own
data fails to support their contentions. Prior to Let’s Deregulate a trio of
articles by Peter Pashigian were the authoritative statement on the main
impetus for the rise in lawyer salaries.78 Pashigian agrees with Let’s Dereg72. See ID. at 67-73.
73. See, e.g., Jane S. Shaw & Richard L. Stroup, Do Environmental Regulations
Increase Economic Efficiency?, 23 REGULATION 13 (1990); LISA HEINZERLING & FRED
ACKERMAN, PRICING THE PRICELESS: COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION,
available
at,
http://ase.tufts.edu/gdae/publications/cb%20pamphlet%20final.pdf; ROBERT STAVINS, IS BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS HELPFUL FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATION?,
available
at,
http://www.robertstavinsblog.org/2009/07/08/is-benefit-cost-analysis-helpful-forenvironmental-regulation/.
74. LET’S DEREGULATE, supra note __, at 65-81 presents this argument.
75. LET’S DEREGULATE, supra note __, at 75-81.
76. ID. at 78-80.
77. Much of my scholarship has focused on the power of the ABA and state bar
lobbying efforts, see, e.g., BARTON, supra note __, at 105-59.
78. See Pashigian, Number and Earnings, supra note __; Pashigian, Market for
Lawyers, supra note __; B. Peter Pashigian, Regulation, Preventive Law, and the Duties of
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ulate that as a result of entry barriers lawyer salaries are higher than would
otherwise be expected.79 Pashigian, however, expressly rejects the hypothesis that increased regulation increases lawyer earnings.80 Pashigian concludes that increases in real gross national product drive both the quantity
and remuneration of lawyers, not increases in regulation.81 Pashigian does
conclude that regulatory changes may drive the allocation of lawyers, but
not the absolute quantity or payment.82
Likewise, Let’s Deregulate actually makes an unwitting case against
the effect of regulation upon lawyer salaries. First, doctors consistently earn
a greater and more consistent income premium than lawyers over the study
period.83 There is no reason to believe that doctors are influenced or helped
by increased regulation. To the contrary, it seems likely that doctors’ earnings have been dampened by government regulation.84
Second, economists have seen a similar rise in salary premiums to
lawyers.85 The authors attempt to connect this rise to “economists’ growing
interactions with the legal profession.” This assertion comes with little empirical evidence to suggest that the rise in the salaries of economists has
been as a result of working for lawyers, rather than the likelier explanation:
economists are now performing more lucrative work in the private sector
rather than teaching.86 The brief section where the authors discuss the rise
in economist salaries (a phenomenon likely to be near and dear to the authors’ hearts) and treat it as a side effect of the regulatory imbalances in the
legal profession is particularly unfortunate and telling: the authors seem
unwilling to consider any data points that disagree with their analysis, especially when arguing the insalubrious effects of government regulations.

Attorneys, in the CHANGING ROLE OF THE CORPORATE ATTORNEY 3 (William J. Carney, ed.
1982) (hereinafter “Duties of Attorneys”). These studies were reprised and updated by symposium participant Thomas D. Morgan in 1994, see Thomas D. Morgan, Economic reality
Facing 21st Century Lawyers, 69 WASH. L. REV. 625 (1994).
79. See Pashigian, Market for Lawyers, supra note __, at 80-85 (concluding that law
schools have undersupplied lawyers for market demand, and that lawyer wages have been
inflated as a result).
80. See Pashigian, Number and Earnings, supra note __, at 77-81; Pashigian, Market for Lawyers, supra note __, at 70-73.
81. See, Pashigian, Number and Earnings, supra note __, at 77-81; Pashigian, Market for Lawyers, supra note __, at 70-73.
82. See Pashigian, Duties of Attorneys, supra note __, at 41-42.
83. See LET’S DEREGULATE, supra note __, at 37-39.
84. Consider, for example, the various cuts to Medicare and Medicaid payouts. For
the most recent round of cuts, see Robert Pear, Obama Proposes $320 Billion in Medicare
and Medicaid Cuts over 10 Years, N.Y. TIMES, at A1 (September 19, 2011).
85. LET’S DEREGULATE, supra note __, at 61-65.
86. ID. at 65.
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III. THE INSIDE/OUTSIDE PERSPECTIVE – WHAT ECONOMISTS TEND TO
GET RIGHT AND WHAT ECONOMISTS MISS
Economists have the advantages and disadvantages of being outsiders
when considering the legal market. The outsider advantage allows them to
disregard some sacred cows that lack empirical foundation. The disadvantage to outsider status is that economists miss some underlying nuances.
A. Advantage Outsiders
Economists offer an outside and generally unbiased view of the legal
profession, unencumbered by professional jargon or mythology. Having
presented my argument for deregulation to many legal audiences over the
years I can report that lawyers, law professors and judges are quite insistent
that barriers to entry need to rise, not lower, because of the poor practice
they regularly witness and as a protection against the potential horrors for
clients from the unauthorized practice of law or multidisciplinary practice. 87
These propositions are typically offered with only anecdotal empirical support.
An outsider is able to cut through these arguments more quickly and
cleanly than a fellow lawyer. Let’s Deregulate, for example, offers a brisk
and concise six-page refutation of the policy justifications for entry barriers.
The authors note that “no evidence exists to justify the ABA’s initial accreditation policies” and that the “weak discipline on lawyers’ conduct”
calls “into question much of the justification for licensure regimes.”88 They
further note that based on the admissions profile of the students denied admission to any school there are qualified applicants being denied admission.89 Most importantly, the purchasers of the complicated legal services
that are most likely to require special training or abilities tend to be either
the government or law firms, and these purchasers are especially well qualified to sort the substandard from the excellent practitioners. This is especially so in light of the current high level of information on individual law87. Milton Friedman tells an illustrative anecdote. A fellow economist was arguing
to a group of lawyers that entry barriers were too high and “used an analogy from the automotive industry:”
Would it not, he said, be absurd if the automobile industry were to argue that no
one should drive a low quality car and therefore that no automobile manufacturer
should be permitted to produce a car that did not come up to the Cadillac standard.
One member of the audience rose and approved the analogy, saying that, of course,
the country cannot afford anything but Cadillac lawyers! This tends to be the professional attitude.
FRIEDMAN, supra note __, at 153.
88. LET’S DEREGULATE, supra note __, at 83-84.
89. ID. at 84-85.
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yers.90 Given the authors’ earlier strong description of the costs of the system, their evisceration of the benefits is particularly effective.
B. Disadvantage Outsiders
There are three main nuances that Let’s Deregulate and other economic studies of the legal profession tend to miss. First, it makes intuitive sense
that as the law grows more complex the demand for lawyers will rise, as
firms will be forced to pay more ex ante to comply with the law and more
ex post to defend law suits or government prosecutions based on violations
of unclear legal standards.91 These claims are difficult to prove empirically
(partially because “complexity” itself is a tricky and potentially immeasurable attribute), but have a theoretical appeal.92 I have likewise argued that
legal complexity is a tremendous advantage to the legal profession in terms
of both work creation and job satisfaction.93
Nevertheless, the insider view of complexity includes the recognition
that judges are prime actors in the drama and that lawyers and judges work
together in a common-law, precedential system to create layers upon layers
of complexity on top of regulations, statutes and the existing common law.94
Both Let’s Deregulate and earlier discussions of the effects of regulation on
the legal profession focus solely on legislative action and regulation by
agencies acting under legislative authority.95 This puts Let’s Deregulate in
the awkward position of trying to link lawyer regulation, bar associations
and the legislation itself into a causal chain. The authors miss, however, a
much easier and clearer causal chain: the way that judges and lawyers work
together to create complexity in case law. When trying cases, lawyers do
not have to lobby unsympathetic legislators for added complexity, they
90. ID. at 86-88.
91. Gillian Hadfield’s work in this area has been particularly strong. See Gillian
Hadfield, The Price of Law: How the Market for Lawyers Distorts the Justice System, 98
MICH. L. REV. 953 (2000).
92. Humorously, the various scholars who have addressed legal complexity frequently come up with relatively convoluted definitions of complexity itself. For example,
Peter Schuck describes legal complexity across four axes – density, complexity, institutional
differentiation, and indeterminacy. Peter H. Schuck, Legal Complexity: Some Causes, Consequences, and Cures, 42 DUKE L.J. 1, 4 (1992). Deborah Paul uses three criteria – complication, intractability, and incoherence. Deborah L. Paul, The Sources of Tax Complexity:
How Much Simplicity Can Fundamental Tax Reform Achieve?, 76 N.C. L. REV. 151, 157-62
(1997). Richard Epstein offers a definition that defines complexity in terms of the public and
private costs of compliance with any rule. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A
COMPLEX WORLD 25-26 (1995).
93. BARTON, supra note __, at 259-83.
94. ID.
95. See Pashigian, Market for Lawyers, supra note __, at 53-54; LET’S DEREGULATE,
supra note __, at 59-67.
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simply need to convince like-minded appellate judges who have their own
reasons to favor complexity.96
Second, Let’s Deregulate makes a similar error in describing the history of lawyer regulation; it assumes that the history of the growth in entry
regulations has been as a result of ABA lobbying of state legislatures.97
This understanding of how professions generate entry barriers is correct, of
course, for every profession except lawyers. The difference for lawyers is
that state supreme courts have taken the leading role in regulation as a constitutional matter.98 This has resulted in quite a different story of selfserving regulation, because lawyers have an easier time lobbying state supreme court justices (and the public is virtually barred from lobbying them)
and because by definition these justices are all former lawyers themselves,
and thus naturally more sympathetic.99 This oversight is more than just a
lost nuance; it shows a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of the
regulation itself, which weakens the entire project.
Lastly, Let’s Deregulate fails to notice that there are currently two different legal professions in the United States, and that deregulation would
likely affect one much more than the other. Take a look at this graph that
shows a bimodal distribution of lawyer incomes:100

96. Judges have powerful incentives to favor complexity as well: they enjoy the
process and it allows them freedom to follow their internal preferences while still appearing
to follow precedent. BARTON, supra note __, at 271-77.
97. LET’S DEREGULATE, supra note __, at 2-3. See also FRIEDMAN, supra note __, at
151-52 (asserting that lawyers have been less successful in generating entry barriers than
doctors because many state legislators were graduates of night law schools).
98. Barton, Judges, supra note __, at 461-65.
99. See BARTON, supra note __, at 132-40 for a longer version of this argument.
100. This graph is reprinted on the Empirical Legal Studies Blog as part of an exceptionally helpful and perceptive post by Bill Henderson. See Bill Henderson, Distribution of
2006 Starting Salaries: Best Graphic Chart of the Year, available at
http://www.elsblog.org/the_empirical_legal_studi/2007/09/distributionof.html?cid=138813146.
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The traditional graph for a labor market is a bell curve, with the median salary at the top of the curve.101 A bimodal distribution is unusual and
speaks volumes about the current nature of the U.S. legal market—there are
in fact two separate legal professions, high end law firm work on the right
side of the graph and government and small firm work on the left side of the
graph.
Because of the salary valley between the two types of practice it is unlikely that deregulation of entry would change much for large law firm practice.102 This is partially because the market for these services is already very

101. See
Greg
Mankiw,
Bimodality,
available
at
http://gregmankiw.blogspot.com/2008/07/bimodality.html.
102. Although the pressures of globalization and the recession are a different matter
altogether. For a masterful (and short) description of these changes, see William D. Henderson & Rachel M. Zahorsky, Law Job Stagnation May Have Started Before the Recession—
And It May Be a Sign of Lasting Change, A.B.A. J. (July 1, 2011, 4:40 AM),
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/paradigm_shift/.
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competitive and crosses international borders.103 There is also significant
competition among lawyers and law students to join these firms. As such, it
is unlikely that even if entry deregulation allowed an influx of new lawyers
into the practice that these (presumably less qualified) lawyers would displace current big firm lawyers or in house counsel.104 Deregulation of multidisciplinary practice and allowing lawyers, economists, accountants, and
management consultants to work together, however, might result in lower
salaries for lawyers in these firms, as lower paid non-lawyers swallowed
some of the most lucrative work, 105 but this may be occurring regardless.106
In fact, the authors’ insistence on connecting the salary of lawyers to
the amount and nature of government regulation may be an attempt to answer to this critique—the salaries at the top end of the distribution scale
(which show the largest earnings premiums) will be unlikely to be affected
by a flood of low-end entrants into the market.107 As such, the best way to
explain the salaries at the top end of the distribution scale is to point to government regulation, rather than concluding that those salaries are a fair result of global competition and/or the intrinsic skills/attributes of these lawyers.108
Nevertheless, Let’s Deregulate glosses over a simpler answer. In a
global legal marketplace clients are willing to pay a premium for the best
representation in high stakes corporate or litigation matters. They are especially willing to pay top dollar for that rarest of legal commodities: genuine
insight.109 As long as these skills and abilities are valued, changes in entry
barriers would be unlikely to affect the salaries of the big firm lawyers and
in-house counsel.

103. For some studies of the internationalization of big firm practice, see J.V. Beaverstock et al., Geographies of Globalization: United States Law Firms in World Cities, 21
URB. GEOGRAPHY 95, 95-120 (2000); Andrew Jones, More than “Managing Across Borders?” The Complex Role of Face-to-Face Interaction in Globalizing Law Firms, 7 J. OF
ECON. GEOGRAPHY 223 (2007); Barney Warf & Chand Wije, The Spatial Structure of Large
U.S. Law Firms, 22 GROWTH AND CHANGE 157 (1991).
104. “Let’s Deregulate” does recognize this possibility, but argues that deregulation
would be beneficial regardless. LET’S DEREGULATE,” supra note __, at 97.
105. See Gillian Hadfield, Legal Barriers to Innovation: The Growing Economic Cost
of Professional Control over Corporate Legal Markets, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1689, 1717-27
(2008).
106. See Henderson & Zahorsky, supra note __.
107. Cf. LET’S DEREGULATE, supra note __, at 40-41 (noting that the income premiums in the top quartile are the highest and are harder to explain as a result of entry barriers).
108. ID. at 59-71.
109. Cf.
Competing
by
Raising
Prices,
available
at
http://www.clientrevolution.com/in-house-counsel/. (noting that new pricing schema for
lawyers does not necessarily mean lower prices, clients will pay more for especially valuable
or insightful legal advice).
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CONCLUSION
Hopefully this discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of the economists’ argument for lawyer deregulation brings home the importance of
cross dialogue on this topic. Economists bring a special set of tools to the
problem and the strength of few pre-conceived notions. Lawyers bring a
nitty-gritty, insider knowledge of the subject that can enrich the economist’s
view. Hopefully more cross-pollination will occur as the argument for deregulation broadens and reaches both legal and general interest audiences.
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